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Abstract
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are pro-cyclical when high-tari¤ interests (e.g. import-competing industries) capture
the government: these groups concede lower tari¤s to low-tari¤ interest groups (e.g.
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recessions lower the opportunity cost of lobbying and thereby generate a stronger lobbying threat.
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Introduction

A striking feature of WTO tari¤ agreements is the lack of commitment to speci…c tari¤ levels.
Rather, countries commit to upper bounds on tari¤s which are known as tari¤ bindings. As
such, countries retain ‡exibility when setting actual tari¤s which are known as applied tari¤s.
A country does not violate its WTO commitments by unilaterally raising its applied tari¤s
as long as they remain below the tari¤ binding. Recent papers (e.g. Nicita et al. (2013)
and Beshkar et al. (2015)) have begun to empirically document the widespread phenomenon
of “binding overhang” whereby countries set applied tari¤s below tari¤ bindings. This is
especially true in developing countries where tari¤ bindings often far exceeded applied tari¤s
after the 1994 Uruguay Round (Bchir et al. (2006) and Nicita et al. (2013)). Moreover, Lake
and Linask (2015) document that developing countries often use this greater ‡exibility by
moving the applied tari¤ for a given product up and down over time.
While recent work has analyzed the theoretical and empirical determinants of applied tari¤s and binding overhang (Bown and Crowley (2013b), Ludema and Mayda (2013), Nicita
et al. (2013) and Beshkar et al. (2015)), these studies have ignored the role of the business cycle. Indeed, conventional wisdom views applied tari¤s as counter-cyclical, rising in
recessions (creating lower binding overhang) and falling in booms (creating higher binding
overhang).1 Nevertheless, using data for over 5,000 products in 72 developed and developing
countries for 2000-2011, Lake and Linask (2015) …nd pro-cyclical applied tari¤s and, thus,
counter-cyclical binding overhang.2 Moreover, they …nd that these results are completely
driven by developing countries, with applied tari¤s being acyclical in developed countries.
In this paper, we present, to the best of our knowledge, the …rst theoretical model attempting to explain the pro-cyclical applied tari¤s and the counter-cyclical binding overhang
empirically observed in developing countries. In our setup, the government is captured by
either high-tari¤ interests (e.g. import-competing …rms) or low-tari¤ interests (e.g. …rms
that export and/or use imported intermediate inputs) and implements the nominated applied tari¤ of the group by whom it is captured.3 In each period, the incumbent group, i.e.
the group who has captured the government and is dictating applied tari¤s, faces the threat
of displacement as a result of lobbying by the opposing group. To mitigate this lobbying
threat, an incumbent group may nominate an applied tari¤ di¤erent from the ideal tari¤ it
would implement absent any lobbying threat.
1

See, e.g., Rodrik (1995, p.687), Bagwell and Staiger (2003, p.1), Costinot (2009, p.1011) and Bown and
Crowley (2013a, p.50).
2
While they do not …nd evidence for pro-cyclical applied tari¤s, recent work by Kee et al. (2013), Rose
(2013) and Gawande et al. (2014) also question the conventional wisdom of counter-cyclical applied tari¤s.
3
Gawande et al. (2012) document the empirical in‡uence exerted over trade policy by …rms importing
intermediate inputs.
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Counter-cyclical binding overhang and pro-cyclical applied tari¤s emerge in equilibrium
when high-tari¤ interests are the incumbent group. Driving this result is the time-varying
opportunity cost of lobbying. Intuitively, using scarce resources for lobbying is more attractive during recessions because recessions are associated with negative productivity shocks or
low prices via low aggregate demand, and these forces depress the marginal revenue product
of resources used in production. Given this pro-cyclical opportunity cost of lobbying, recessions produce a stronger lobbying threat from the opposing group. To preemptively mitigate
the stronger lobbying threat of the opposing group during recessions, the incumbent group
makes concessions by moving the applied tari¤ away from its own ideal tari¤ and toward the
ideal tari¤ of the opposing group. That is, applied tari¤s are pro-cyclical and binding overhang is counter-cyclical when high-tari¤ interests are the incumbent group dictating tari¤
policy. Conversely, applied tari¤s are counter-cyclical and binding overhang is pro-cyclical
when low-tari¤ interests are the incumbent group. Thus, our results are consistent with the
view that high-tari¤ interests have a dominant in‡uence over tari¤ policy.
Motivated by the seminal work of Krueger (1974), Bhagwati (1982) and Acemoglu and
Robinson (2001), the core version of our model assumes that lobbying by the opposing group
destroys a fraction of the economy’s resources. We extend the model to allow high-tari¤ and
low-tari¤ interests to simultaneously and strategically choose an amount of labor for lobbying
with the residual labor used to produce output. Here, recessions not only a¤ect economic
output directly but also indirectly via the endogenous allocation of labor between production
after lobbying. Nevertheless, the key insight remains: the opportunity cost of lobbying is
lower during recessions than booms and, therefore, tari¤s are pro-cyclical when high-tari¤
interests dictate tari¤ policy. Thus, our results extend to di¤erent formalizations of lobbying;
the key feature is the pro-cyclical opportunity cost of lobbying.
More broadly, the idea that the opportunity cost of initiating con‡ict is lower when economic conditions are less favorable is deeply rooted in the civil war literature. For example,
Blattman and Miguel (2010, p.12) argue that “Their [Chassang and Padro-i Miquel (2009)]
key insight is that transient economic shocks increase the immediate incentives to …ght but
not the discounted present value of victory. The model thus implies that in dire economic
circumstances groups predate upon one another since they have less to lose than in periods where the returns to production are higher.” Blattman and Miguel (2010) also discuss
supporting empirical evidence including Collier and Hoe- er (2004) and Miguel et al. (2004).
Because the central mechanism we propose is that the group in control of tari¤ setting
manipulates tari¤s to pre-emptively avoid opposition lobbying, lobbying does not arise in
the equilibrium of our model. Of course, super…cial anecdotal evidence suggests lobbying
is a pervasive phenomena. However, in a comprehensive review of the empirical lobbying
2

literature, de Figueiredo and Richter (2014, p.178) argue that important directions for future
research include understanding “Why is there so little money in lobbying” and “... why do
so few interest groups lobby.” Our model suggests that part of the answers may be that
interest groups who exert dominant in‡uences over policy are willing to cede ground when
facing a strong latent lobbying threat by opposition groups.
As discussed earlier in the introduction (and in the following section), applied tari¤s
and binding overhang appear acyclical in developed countries. While our model will not
directly address why tari¤ cyclicality di¤ers between developed and developing countries,
the mechanism of our model may still be relevant for developed countries. But, if so, other
important and o¤setting mechanisms may dominate in developed countries.
Our paper complements the theoretical literature analyzing the cyclicality of tari¤s. In a
model of self-enforcing trade agreements that neutralize terms of trade externalities, Bagwell
and Staiger (2003) show how the persistence of business cycles with pro-cyclical trade volumes
implies that the cost of deviating from a reciprocal trade agreement is pro-cyclical. In turn,
and in contrast to our model, trade policy is more liberal during booms.4
According to Bagwell and Staiger (pp.1-2), the conventional domestic political economy
story behind tari¤ cyclicality, whereby policy makers raise tari¤s in response to stronger
lobbying by import-competing …rms during recessions, is unsatisfactory because it ignores
the role of lobbying by …rms favoring lower tari¤s (e.g. export …rms or …rms using imported
inputs). Indeed, this is their primary motivation for exploring a mechanism based on international interactions. Moreover, recent work by Nicita et al. (2013) and Miyagiwa et al. (2015)
emphasize the role played by trade partner size and retaliation motives in international tari¤
wars.5,6 Thus, while there is ample theoretical and empirical support that the mechanisms
mediated through international interactions are important determinants of trade policy, our
objective is to explore the role played by domestic political economy concerns. To do so, we
abstract from the impact of international interactions. Indeed, by explicitly modeling the
domestic interaction between high- and low-tari¤ interests, we address Bagwell and Staiger’s
criticism of the literature taking a one-sided view of domestic political economy mechanisms.
Our paper also …ts into the literature proposing explanations for binding overhang.7
4

The literature includes other explanations for counter-cyclicality such as maintaining budget balances
(Hansen (1990)); the cyclicality of …rm entry incentives (McKeown (1983) and Gallarotti (1985)); and the
larger marginal employment impact of tari¤s when unemployment is higher (Costinot (2009)).
5
A nascent literature discusses the impact of global supply chains, and international ownership more
generally, on trade policy. See, for example, Blanchard (2007), Blanchard (2010), and Bown et al. (2016).
6
Lake and Linask (2015) also present empirical evidence that terms of trade motivations could be part
of the story behind the observed pro-cyclical tari¤s in developing countries. Naturally, however, this does
not preclude domestic political economy considerations also playing a role.
7
For papers considerting the implications of binding overhang rather than its causes see, e.g., Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare (1998), Francois and Martin (2004), Nicita et al. (2013) and Handley (2014).
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Speci…cally, our paper provides a structural interpretation for the random political pressure
variable that plays a key role in one of the two main explanations in the literature. Within the
terms of trade theory of trade agreements, Bagwell and Staiger (2005), Amador and Bagwell
(2013) and Beshkar et al. (2015) show that binding overhang emerges as a natural feature of
an optimal trade agreement when countries have private information about a random political
pressure variable representing their time-varying preference for protectionism. Thus, while
countries value the ability to internalize terms of trade externalities through committing to
lower tari¤s, they also value the ‡exibility to adjust tari¤s in response to realized political
pressure. Interpreting the strength of the lobbying threat as the random political pressure
variable, our model gives a structural foundation for this random political pressure variable
and links it to the dynamics of binding overhang.8

2

Empirical observations

Our model provides a potential explanation for two empirical observations in developing
countries: (i) the applied tari¤ for a given product often moves up and down over time and
(ii) contrary to the conventional wisdom, applied tari¤s are pro-cyclical. Lake and Linask
(2015) document these empirical observations using a sample of over 5000 products and 72
countries for the period 2000-2011 (51 developing countries, 16 developed, and 5 that change
categories over the sample period).
While recent papers have documented that developing countries have larger binding overhang than developed countries, Lake and Linask (2015) document that developing countries
also use this ‡exibility by adjusting tari¤s more frequently than developed countries. Table 1
illustrates that 12:73% of country-product pairs in developing countries see the applied tari¤
both increase and decrease over the sample period compared to 5:72% of country-product
pairs in developed countries.
[Place Table 1 about here]
Tables 4 and 5 in the Appendix present summary statistics as well as variable de…nitions and sources for the regressions in Table 2, which regress overhang (Panel A) and
the applied tari¤ (Panel B) on the lagged business cycle (BCi;t 1 ).9,10 All regressions use
8

The second explanation in the literature for binding overhang is provided by Horn et al. (2010) who
show that binding overhang emerges as a feature of an optimal incomplete contract in a costly contracting
environment because of the state contingent nature of binding overhang.
9
Our primary business cycle measure is de-trended log real GDP using the Hodrick-Prescott …lter (as in
Rose (2013)). The results are robust to using alternative …ltering techniques, including the Baxter-King and
Christiano-Fitzgerald …lters. See Lake and Linask (2015) for a detailed description of data sources.
10
We exclude the following observations to ensure the results are unrelated to outliers, transitional WTO
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the following control variables, emphasized recently as important determinants of applied
tari¤s and binding overhang: market power at the country-product level (M Pi;j ; see, e.g.,
Bagwell and Staiger (2011), Ludema and Mayda (2013), Nicita et al. (2013) and Beshkar
et al. (2015)), share of product level imports sourced from preferential trade agreement partners (P T A_IMi;j;t ; see, e.g., Ludema and Mayda (2013)), and lagged import surges at the
country-product level and their volatility ( IMi;j;t 1 and sd IMi;j;t 1 ; see, e.g., Bown and
Crowley (2013b)). All regressions also control for the lagged trend component of log real
GDP (yi;t 1 ) as well as year and country-sector …xed e¤ects where a sector is a 4-digit HS
category. Column (1) is the baseline speci…cation with columns (2)-(4) presenting three robustness speci…cations: column (2) excludes agricultural products, column (3) includes only
original WTO members and column (4) excludes the Great Recession years.11
[Place Table 2 about here]
The results clearly show that binding overhang is counter-cyclical and applied tari¤s
are pro-cyclical in developing countries but acyclical in developed countries. As expected,
given that binding overhang is the tari¤ binding less the applied tari¤, the absolute value
of the point estimates for BCi;t 1 are nearly identical across overhang and applied tari¤
speci…cations. In addition to columns (2)-(4), these results are robust to numerous robustness
exercises explored extensively in Lake and Linask (2015).

3
3.1

Model
The economy

We analyze an in…nite horizon, small open economy with three groups of agents: low-tari¤
interests (L) and high-tari¤ interests (H), each producing separate goods, and workers.
Low-tari¤ interests may be …rms that export and/or use imported intermediate imports. A
growing literature documents that imported intermediate input users are also often export
…rms and that they experience adverse e¤ects from protection (e.g. Amiti and Konings
(2007), Kasahara and Rodrigue (2008), Konings and Vandenbussche (2013), Blonigen (2015)
commitments and violation of or rectifying WTO commitments: (i) observations during the phase-in period
of the Uruguay Round or the Information Technology Agreement, (ii) observations where the tari¤ binding
changes over the sample period, (iii) observations where the magnitude of the applied tari¤ change lies in the
top 1% of applied tari¤ increases or the top 1% of applied tari¤ decreases, (iv) observations with negative
overhang and (v) observations where the applied tari¤ moves below the tari¤ binding after it had previously
moved above the tari¤ binding.
11
We de…ne the Great Rcession years as 2009-2011 which means that we drop the years 2010 and 2011 in
column (4) given that our dependent variable is the lagged business cycle.
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and Vandenbussche and Viegelahn (2015)). High-tari¤ interests are import-competing …rms,
which naturally bene…t from the increased domestic prices caused by tari¤s. As in Grossman
and Helpman (1994), workers do not lobby in our model.
The economy faces business cycle ‡uctuations that depress the marginal revenue product
of labor used by H and L. These ‡uctuations could result from either aggregate demand
shocks that depress prices or productivity shocks. Speci…cally, a boom (B) and a recession
(R) occur with respective probabilities 1
and . Potential real aggregate income for
! 2 fB; Rg is
(
1 if ! = B
A! Y where A! =
(1)
a < 1 if ! = R
and a1 denotes the severity of the business cycle shock.
The applied tari¤, , determines the distribution of the economy’s real aggregate income.
Speci…cally, the one-period indirect utility of group i 2 fH; Lg is given by
i

( ; A! ) =

i

( ) A! Y

ui ( ; A! ) if lobbying does not take place
ui ( ; A! ) if lobbying takes place

(2)

with 2 (0; 1), i ( ) 2 (0; 1), 0H ( ) > 0 and 0L ( ) < 0. Further, H ( )+ L ( ) 1, with
the inequality admitting payments to workers and e¢ ciency costs of tari¤s. When tari¤s
impose e¢ ciency costs, i.e. 0H ( ) + 0L ( ) < 0, we assume 0H ( ) > 0 so that the positive
income redistribution e¤ect for high-tari¤ interests outweighs the negative e¢ ciency cost of
a higher tari¤.
Since tari¤s mediate income distribution, both high- and low-tari¤ interests want tari¤
setting control. In any period, the government is captured by one of these groups, who
then dictate applied tari¤ setting. The group not currently in control of tari¤-setting can
gain control via costly lobbying.12 We assume that lobbying destroys a proportion 1
of
indirect utility in the period when lobbying takes place. Thus, represents the e¢ ciency of
lobbying with a higher implying lobbying is less costly. While the subsequent analysis only
relies on lobbying being costly for both groups and not that it is equally costly, we assume
lobbying is equally costly for tractability. Indeed, our results hold if costs are unequal but
arbitrarily small for the group not lobbying.
Initially, we model lobbying in a highly stylized manner: the group not currently in
control can choose to lobby, and any such lobbying is successful in gaining tari¤-setting control. The group currently in control can only mitigate the lobbying threat by preemptively
altering the applied tari¤. This highly stylized approach abstracts from the realistic pos12

As in Grossman and Helpman (1994) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), we assume away any collective
action problems that undermine the lobbying ability of the groups.
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sibility of “lobbying wars” but highlights that business cycle ‡uctuations directly generate
a pro-cyclical opportunity cost of lobbying via productivity ‡uctuations. When we extend
the analysis in Section 5 to accommodate lobbying wars where each group simultaneously
lobbies, business cycle ‡uctuations also a¤ect the allocation of labor between lobbying and
production. Nevertheless, due to o¤setting e¤ects on the demand for lobbying labor, whether
aggregate lobbying is pro- or counter-cyclical is ambiguous and, in turn, so are the implications for the opportunity cost of lobbying. Thus, the direct productivity e¤ect remains
the key mechanism driving cyclical ‡uctuations in the opportunity cost of lobbying. We
therefore abstract from the possibility of lobbying wars in the baseline analysis to highlight
this key mechanism.
Our stylized baseline analysis puts business cycle ‡uctuations at center stage. However,
industry characteristics such as industry concentration may impact the success of lobbying
and hence tari¤ setting. In Section 5, we extend the analysis so that lobbying is successful
with a probability that can depend on relevant industry characteristics. Lobbying thus
mediates the e¤ect of industry characteristics on the level of tari¤s. But, these time-invariant
industry characteristics do not alter the property that the opportunity cost of lobbying is
lower during recessions and hence do not alter our qualitative results on the cyclicality of
tari¤s.
Ultimately, the crucial feature of our lobbying formulation, regardless of the speci…cs,
is that the opportunity cost of lobbying is lower during recessions than booms. Intuitively,
business cycle ‡uctuations imply that using productive resources for lobbying rather than
producing output is less costly during recessions.

3.2

Role of lobbying and stages within each period

The game comprises in…nite periods. Motivated by the GATT and the WTO as institutions
that orchestrate lower global tari¤s, we assume that the government is captured by hightari¤ interests at the beginning of period one.13 Since we focus on temporal ‡uctuations in
binding overhang and applied tari¤s and our results hold qualitatively for any tari¤ binding
1 in place at the beginning of the game, we take 1 as exogenous. Thus, our model is
consistent with the view that tari¤ bindings were strategically negotiated during the Uruguay
Round (Beshkar et al. (2015)) or that some WTO members, especially developing countries,
submitted very high and somewhat arbitrarily chosen tari¤ bindings after the conclusion of
the Uruguay Round (Nicita et al. (2013)). In either case, 1 can be viewed as the tari¤
binding in place following the Uruguay Round.
13
The need for tari¤ reductions suggests tari¤s are high enough that high-tari¤ interests have substantial
in‡uence over trade policy.

7

Generically, we denote the group who has captured the government at the beginning of
period t by group i and the other group by group i0 . The following describes the timing of
events within any period.
1. The shock to the economy, A! , is realized. If
place and the period ends.

t

= 0, production and consumption take

2. If t > 0, group i decides whether to cede control of the government to group i0 (
or not cede control ( i = 0).

i

= 1)

(a) If group i does not cede control, it nominates an applied tari¤ .
(b) If group i cedes control, group i0 nominates an applied tari¤ .
3. If group i chooses not to cede control in Stage 2, group i0 chooses whether to lobby
( i0 = 1) or not ( i0 = 0).
(a) If group i0 lobbies, it captures the government and nominates an applied tari¤
and a tari¤ binding .
4. The government implements the nominated applied tari¤ and, if relevant, the nominated tari¤ binding of the group who has captured the government.
5. Production and consumption take place.
While groups do not lobby simultaneously here (section 5.2 considers this possibility),
both groups strategically a¤ect the eventual outcome. In particular, group i can preemptively
avoid lobbying by group i0 in two ways. First, group i can alter their nominated tari¤ away
from their ideal tari¤ and towards the ideal tari¤ of group i0 . That is, high-tari¤ interests
(low-tari¤ interests) can lower (raise) the tari¤ below the tari¤ binding (above zero). Second,
group i can cede control of the government, and hence applied tari¤ setting, to group i0 . In
both cases, by avoiding lobbying, group i prevents an even worse outcome where group i0 sets
both the tari¤ binding and the applied tari¤. The possibility of high-tari¤ interests ceding
control of applied tari¤ setting to low-tari¤ interests allows the possibility of non-zero tari¤s
when low-tari¤ interests control tari¤-setting because ceding control may prevent low-tari¤
interests from lobbying and implementing a zero tari¤ binding.14,15
14

If high-tari¤ interests were unable to cede control to low-tari¤ interests then our anaylsis in Section
4.2 would be qualitiatively identical. However, the analysis in Section 4.3 would become redundant because
violation of the low-tari¤ interest no-lobbying condition would result in low-tari¤ interests lobbying and
implementing a zero tari¤ binding.
15
The assumption that low-tari¤ interests nominate a new tari¤ binding after successfully lobbying is
purely for tractability and does not qualitatively a¤ect our main results. We return to this point at the end
of Section 4.2.
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3.3

States, strategies and equilibrium concept

We solve for a pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium. Except when the tari¤ binding is
zero, i.e. = 0, each state is a triple consisting of the state of the economy, the group who
has captured the government, and the tari¤ binding. We let denote the set of states:
=0
denotes states where the tari¤ binding is zero, and i for i = H; L denotes states where
high- or low-tari¤ interests have captured the government and > 0.16
A strategy for player j is a function specifying the actions taken by player j for each state
2 .17 When player j begins the period as the opposing group, it conditions its actions
on those already taken by the other group within the period. We let sj denote a strategy
for player j, s = (sj ; sj 0 ) denote the strategy pro…le, and ( ; 0 j s) denote the transition
probability from state to state 0 given the strategy pro…le s. For the Bellman equations
max
Vj ( ) =
sj
max
Vj 0 ( ) =
sj 0

(

(

j

sj ; sj 0 ;

; A! ; sj ; sj 0

+

X
0

j0

sj ; sj 0 ;

; A! ; sj ; sj 0

+

2

X
0

2

; 0 j sj ; sj 0
; 0 j sj ; sj 0

Vj ( 0 )

)

)

Vj 0 ( 0 ) ;

s = sj ; sj 0 is a Markov Perfect Equilibrium if sj solves Vj ( ) for all 2 and sj 0 solves
Vj 0 ( ) for all 2 . Without loss of generality, we restrict attention to strategies where (i)
high tari¤ interests nominate when nominating an applied tari¤ or a tari¤ binding and
(ii) low-tari¤ interests nominate 0 when nominating an applied tari¤ or a tari¤ binding after
lobbying.18
Figure 1 depicts the relationship between actions and state transitions. When 2 H
and high-tari¤ interests do not cede control ( H = 0), the resulting state depends on whether
low-tari¤ interests lobby. If low-tari¤ interests lobby ( L = 1), the government implements
a zero tari¤ binding which, by WTO rules, remains in place forever, and the economy moves
to the recurrent class of states =0 . If low-tari¤ interests do not lobby ( L = 0), high-tari¤
interests maintain control. When 2 H and high-tari¤ interests cede control ( H = 1),
16
Because there is no possibility of setting a non-zero applied tari¤ when the tari¤ binding is 0, it no
longer matters whether low- or high-tari¤ interests have captured the government for states in
=0 .
17
As described in Section 3.2, the set of possible actions includes whether to cede control or not ( ),
whether to lobby or not ( ), a nominated applied tari¤, and a nominated tari¤ binding.
18
Low-tari¤ interests would nominate = 0 when lobbying because it maximizes their continuation payo¤
and the opportunity cost of lobbying is independent of the tari¤ nomination. Since WTO rules prohibit
raising , high-tari¤ interests will only lobby to change if it preemptively prevents lobbying by low-tari¤
interests. However, we assume the initial tari¤ binding 1 has been set such that any mutual gains highand low-tari¤ interests could derive from lowering 1 have been exploited. Optimality of the applied tari¤
nominations described in the text follow because they maximize each group’s current period utility but do
not impact the state in the following period.

9

then low-tari¤ interests capture the government and the economy moves to L .
2 L
is similar to 2 H : if low-tari¤ interests cede control ( L = 1) then high-tari¤ interests
capture the government and the economy moves back to H . If low-tari¤ interests do not
cede control ( L = 0) then (i) low-tari¤ interests maintain control if high-tari¤ interests do
not lobby ( H = 0) but (ii) if high-tari¤ interests lobby ( H = 1) then high-tari¤ interests
capture control and the economy returns to H .

Figure 1: State transitions

4
4.1

Equilibrium analysis
The incentive to maintain control of the government

To begin, we present an assumption that restricts attention to non-trivial equilibria. The
assumption guarantees that high- and low-tari¤ interests want to maintain control of the
government whenever they can preemptively avoid lobbying by the opposing group. Thus,
high-tari¤ interests (low-tari¤ interests) will not cede control to low-tari¤ interests (high-tari¤
interests) if they can instead avoid opposition lobbying by setting lower (higher) applied
tari¤s. Further, the assumption ensures high-tari¤ interests can maintain control during
booms and that low-tari¤ interests can maintain control during booms and recessions.
Assumption 1 requires some additional notation. When high-tari¤ interests control tari¤setting, R;H and B;H are the equilibrium tari¤s that high-tari¤ interests set in, respectively,
recessions and booms; analogously, low-tari¤ interests set R;L and B;L when controlling
tari¤-setting. Disregarding the constraints
0 and
, ~R;H and ~B;H denote the
maximum tari¤s high-tari¤ interests can set and still avoid lobbying by low-tari¤ interests;
analogously, ~R;L and ~B;L denote the minimum tari¤s low-tari¤ interests can set and still
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avoid lobbying by high-tari¤ interests.19 Further, !;i ( 0 ; 1 )
ui ( 1 ; A! ) ui ( 0 ; A! )
denotes the change in group i’s payo¤ when the tari¤ changes from 0 to 1 and the state
of the economy is !.
Assumption 1. (i) ~B;H 0 and ~R;H <
(ii) ~B;L
and ~R;L 2 (0; ]
(iii) R;L R;L ; + B;L B;H ; 0 < 0
(iv) R;H R;H ; R;L + (1
) B;H
(v) R;L R;L ; 0 + (1
) B;L B;L ;

B;H ;

B;L

B;H

<0

<0

Parts (i) and (ii) of Assumption 1 rule out degenerate equilibria.20 First, ~B;H 0 ( B;L
)
ensures high-tari¤ interests (low-tari¤ interests) can maintain control in some state of the
economy.21 Second, given ~B;H > ~R;H and ~B;L < ~R;L will follow later, ~R;H < (~R;L > 0)
ensures high-tari¤ interests (low-tari¤ interests) cannot always maintain control by setting
the applied tari¤ equal to their ideal tari¤: tari¤s will ‡uctuate. Finally, since low-tari¤
interests can only obtain control after high-tari¤ interests have control, ~R;L
helps rule
out the possibility of equilibrium control cycling between high-tari¤ interests and low-tari¤
interests.22 Part (iii) also helps rule this out by requiring that low-tari¤ interests cannot gain
from ceding control in the current period and regaining control in the subsequent period.23
Finally, our model of lobbying is of interest only if lobbying is a possibility, i.e. both
groups potentially want to lobby. Intuitively, this happens only if maintaining control of
tari¤ setting is bene…cial. Parts (iv) and (v) of Assumption 1 guarantee this by ensuring
that the continuation value of maintaining control exceeds the continuation value of ceding
control (Wi (i) > Wi (i0 ) in terms of later notation).24
19

Equation (5) de…nes the relationship between the equilibrium tari¤s !;i and the tari¤s ~!;i .
Graphically, parts (i) and (ii) restrict the intersection of the no-lobbying curves in Figure 2 to certain
regions.
21
Given the no-lobbying conditions will be tighter in recessions than booms, tari¤-setting control would
continually switch between high- and low-tari¤ interests if this assumption were violated. In turn, the tari¤
would continually switch between 0 and .
22
Allowing the possibility of control continually shifting between high- and low-tari¤ interests does not
qualitatively a¤ect the analysis in Section 4.2. However, allowing this would create two cases to consider
upon high-tari¤ interests ceding control: (i) the case considered in Section 4.3 where low-tari¤ interests
maintain control and (ii) the case where control repeatedly switches between high- and low-tari¤ interests.
We abstract from this latter possibility for ease of exposition.
23
To see this, note that R;L R;L ;
0 is the smallest one period loss su¤ered by low-tari¤ interests
when ceding control to high-tari¤ interests and B;L B;H ; 0
0 is the biggest one period gain for low-tari¤
interests when high-tari¤ interests cede control back to low-tari¤ interests.
24
Recall that ceding control also has future costs in that control may reside with the other group for an
extended period of time.
20
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4.2

When high-tari¤ interests dictate applied tari¤ setting

Since the game begins with high-tari¤ interests having captured the government (and Section
4.1 ensures they prefer to retain control), we …rst derive the maximum tari¤s that hightari¤ interests can set and still avoid lobbying by low-tari¤ interests in either state of the
economy. Preventing lobbying bene…ts high-tari¤ interests because (i) it averts the direct
costs of lobbying, (ii) it prevents the permanent reduction in bound tari¤s implied by lowtari¤ interests lobbying, and (iii) high-tari¤ interests retain the possibility of setting higher
future tari¤s (up to the binding). To this end, suppose high-tari¤ interests dictate tari¤
setting (i.e. 2 H ) and have not ceded control (i.e. H = 0). Let VL ( j L = 0; H = 0)
and VL ( j L = 1; H = 0) denote the choice-speci…c value functions for low-tari¤ interests
and Wi ( = 0) denote the expected continuation payo¤ to player i given 2 =0 and prior
to realization of A! 2 fAB ; AR g. Similarly denote Wi (L) and Wi (H) given 2 L and
2 H . That is, Wi ( ) are ex-ante value functions. Then,
VL ( j

L

= 1;

H

= 0) =

uL (0; A! ) + WL ( = 0) and

VL ( j

L

= 0;

H

= 0) = uL (

!;H ; A! )

+ WL (H)

represent the payo¤s to low-tari¤ interests associated with lobbying and not lobbying given
that high-tari¤ interests have not ceded control.
Naturally, low-tari¤ interests lobby if and only if VL ( j L = 1; H = 0) > VL ( j L = 0;
Thus, the low-tari¤ interest no–lobbying condition is
uL (
|

!;H ; A! )

{z

uL (0; A! )
}

opportunity cost of lobbying

[WL ( = 0) WL (H)]
|
{z
}

f!;L

0

(3)

future value of lobbying

for ! = B; R. While uL (0; A! ) uL ( !;H ; A! ), lobbying destroys a proportion (1
) of
low-tari¤ interests’indirect utility. Thus, uL ( !;H ; A! )
uL (0; A! ) represents the indirect
utility that low-tari¤ interests forego in the current period because of lobbying.25 Conversely,
WL ( = 0) WL (H) represents the future value of lobbying by capturing the change in lowtari¤ interests’expected continuation payo¤ via lobbying. Thus, (3) says low-tari¤ interests
lobby if and only if the future value of lobbying exceeds the opportunity cost of lobbying.
Importantly, (3) shows that, for a given tari¤ , the opportunity cost of lobbying is lower
in booms than recessions. In particular, (2) implies that the opportunity cost of lobbying in
recessions is scaled down from that in booms by a factor a < 1. This captures the intuitive
idea that recessions arise because of negative productivity shocks or depressed prices, making
25

Throughout the paper we assume that the opportunity cost of lobbying is positive.
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H

= 0).

it relatively more attractive to use resources for lobbying than production in recessions.
Intuitively, the future value of lobbying for low-tari¤ interests stems from having a permanently zero applied tari¤ rather than facing the applied tari¤s imposed by high-tari¤
interests. Since =0 is a recurrent class, this intuition is formalized by26
WL ( = 0)

WL (H) =

1
1

[ a

R;L

(

R;H ; 0)

+ (1

)

B;L

(

B;H ; 0)] :

(4)

While the opportunity cost of lobbying is lower during recessions, the future value of lobbying does not depend on whether lobbying takes place in a boom or recession. Importantly,
all else equal, this implies that the low-tari¤ interest no-lobbying condition is tighter (i.e. the
lobbying threat is stronger) during recessions than booms. Because lower tari¤s increase the
opportunity cost and decrease the future value of lobbying for low-tari¤ interests, high-tari¤
interests mitigate the stronger low-tari¤ interest lobbying threat in recessions by lowering the
applied tari¤. Thus applied tari¤s are pro-cyclical and binding overhang is counter-cyclical
when high-tari¤ interests maintain control of the government and dictate applied tari¤s.
Figure 2 illustrates the problem faced by high-tari¤ interests when preventing lobbying
by low-tari¤ interests. Since the no-lobbying conditions in either state of the economy
depend on the tari¤s set in both states, the no-lobbying conditions are represented by loci in
( R;H ; B;H ) space. In particular, tari¤s lying above the f!;L = 0 locus violate the low-tari¤
interest no-lobbying condition in the state of the economy !.27 Each locus is downward
sloping because a higher B;H can accompany a lower R;H and leave the future value of
lobbying una¤ected and therefore f!;L = 0. However, the recession no-lobbying contour
curve is steeper than the boom no-lobbying contour curve: a larger increase in B;H can
accompany a given decrease in R;H under the recession no-lobbying condition relative to
the boom no-lobbying condition.28
To derive (4), note that WL ( = 0) = 1 1 ( a + (1
)) uL (0; AB ) and, using the one shot deviation
principle to write WL (H) to re‡ect that low-tari¤ interests never lobby in any future period, we also have
WL (H) = 1 1 [ auL ( R;H ; AB ) + (1
) uL ( B;H ; AB )].
27
Each locus de…nes a combination of tari¤s that prevent lobbying in the current state not only in the
current period but any future period.
28
To see this note that a lower (higher) R;H ( B;H ) relaxes (tightens) f!;L 0 more (less) in recessions
than booms because R;H ( B;H ) a¤ects both the opportunity cost and the future value of lobbying in
recessions (booms) but only the latter in booms (recessions). Mathematically, letting superscripts denote
26

partial derivatives with respect to the given variable, we have 0 >
@
@

B;H
R;H

fR;L =0

=

(1+

1 )a
2

R;H
B;L ( R;H ;0)
B;H
B;L ( B;H ;0)

where

1

and

1
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2

@
@
1

B;H
R;H

(1

fB;L =0

).

=

1a

(1+

2)

R;H
B;L ( R;H ;0)
B;H
B;L ( B;H ;0)

>

Figure 2: Low tari¤ interest no-lobbying conditions
The intersection of the no-lobbying loci yield the maximum tari¤s, ~B;H and ~R;H , hightari¤ interests can set while still preventing low-tari¤ interest lobbying in both booms and
recessions. Moreover, ~R;H < ~B;H because the no-lobbying condition is tighter in recessions
than booms given that the opportunity cost of lobbying is higher during booms for any given
tari¤.29 That is, tari¤s are pro-cyclical and, hence, binding overhang is counter-cyclical. This
is our main result (see Proposition 1 below).
Real world institutional features constrain the preemptive tari¤s that high-tari¤ interests
set. First, WTO rules impose B;H
. If the fB;L = 0 locus in Figure 2 was higher to
the extent that it intersected the fR;L = 0 locus above B;H = , high-tari¤ interests could
prevent low-tari¤ interests lobbying in booms by setting an applied tari¤ above . But,
given B;H
, low-tari¤ interests instead set B;H = and the constrained applied tari¤
in recessions is then ~R;H ( ) in Figure 2.30 Second, tari¤s must be non-negative. That is,
high-tari¤ interests can only prevent low-tari¤ interest lobbying in booms and recessions if
the intersection of the no-lobbying loci yields ~R;H
0 and ~B;H
0; otherwise, low-tari¤
interests will lobby in some state of the economy even if high-tari¤ interests set a zero applied
tari¤.31 Letting R;H and B;H denote the equilibrium tari¤s that high-tari¤ interests set in
29

If we impose an exogenous probability of lobbying success, then the possibility of unsuccessful lobbying
relaxes both no-lobbying conditions and allows high-tari¤ interests to raise preemptive tari¤s (see section
5.1).
30
In this situation, WTO rules constrain the tari¤ in booms so that it is lower than it needs to be to
prevent lobbying. But, the tari¤ in recessions ~R;H ( ) is still as high as possible such that it prevents
lobbying by low-tari¤ interests.
31
Once the no-lobbying condition of low-tari¤ interests is violated during recessions then, as discussed
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booms and recessions, we have:

R;H

8
>
<

~R;H if 0 ~R;H ; ~B;H
=
~R;H ( ) if 0 ~R;H
< ~B;H ; and
>
:
0 if ~R;H < 0

B;H

=

(

if ~B;H >
~B;H if ~B;H

:

(5)

Assumption 1 and the foregoing analysis produce the following Lemma.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, the only situation where a group cedes control of tari¤
setting is when high-tari¤ interests cede control during recessions. This happens if and only
if the low-tari¤ interest no-lobbying condition during recessions fails for R;H = 0.
And, given Lemma 1, the main result of our paper now follows.
Proposition 1. When high-tari¤ interests maintain control of the government during booms
and recessions then applied tari¤s are pro-cyclical and binding overhang is counter-cyclical.
This cyclicality is strengthened when recessions are more severe. Further, high-tari¤ interests
are more likely to maintain control of the government when recessions are less severe, when
recessions are more frequent, and when lobbying is less e¢ cient.
The intuition behind the cyclicality is simple: recessions lower the opportunity cost of lowtari¤ interests lobbying and, therefore, high-tari¤ interests concede lower applied tari¤s to
preempt the stronger lobbying threat. By preventing low-tari¤ interests from lobbying,
high-tari¤ interests prevent both the immediate costs of lobbying as well as the permanent
imposition of tari¤s bound at zero.
Proposition 1 highlights two further results: (i) tari¤ cyclicality is strengthened when
recessions are more severe but (ii) the ability of high-tari¤ interests to maintain control
of tari¤ setting is strengthened when recessions are less severe or more frequent and when
lobbying is less e¢ cient. In either state of the economy, a change in a parameter representing
economic conditions (a, , or ) has direct and indirect e¤ects on the lobbying threat of lowtari¤ interests. Given a state of the economy !, each parameter can directly a¤ect both the
opportunity cost of lobbying and the future value of lobbying.32 An indirect e¤ect emerges
because changes in the preemptive tari¤ in the other state of the economy will, in turn, a¤ect
the attractiveness of lobbying in the present state.33 The two e¤ects, which may or may not
in the following section, high-tari¤ interests will cede control of the government to low-tari¤ interests. In
turn, this will alter the functional form of fB;L in (3) because WL (H) must then embody that high-tari¤
interests cede control to low-tari¤ interests during recessions rather than high-tari¤ interests maintaining
control forever.
32
This is captured by the shift in the f!;L = 0 locus and the associated e¤ect on !;H while holding !0 ;H
…xed for ! 0 6= !.
33
This is captured by the shift in the f!0 ;L = 0 locus.
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move in the same direction, are summarized in Table 3 where D denotes the direct e¤ect
and I denotes the indirect e¤ect.
[Place Table 3 about here]
The direct and indirect e¤ects of more severe recessions, i.e. a lower a, move in the same
direction. In booms, a lower a reduces the future value of low-tari¤ interest lobbying by
lowering the present discounted value of future income (see (4)). This direct e¤ect shifts the
fB;L = 0 locus in Figure 2 upward: for a given R;H , high-tari¤ interests can raise B;H and
still avoid low-tari¤ interest lobbying during booms (see (3)). In recessions, the same e¤ect
of a lower a is present but is outweighed by the lower a reducing the opportunity cost of
lobbying for low-tari¤ interests. This direct e¤ect strengthens the low-tari¤ interest lobbying
threat and shifts the fR;L = 0 locus shifts leftward: for a given B;H , high-tari¤ interests
must set a lower R;H to avoid low-tari¤ interests lobbying during recessions.
The indirect e¤ects reinforce these direct e¤ects. First, on account of the direct e¤ect
that lowered R;H , the future value of low-tari¤ interest lobbying falls during booms (see (4)).
In turn, this relaxes the low-tari¤ interest no-lobbying condition during booms and allows
a higher B;H (see (3)). Second, on account of the direct e¤ect that raised B;H , the future
value of low-tari¤ interest lobbying rises during recessions (see (4)). In turn, this tightens the
low-tari¤ interest no-lobbying condition during recessions and reduces R;H (see (3)). Thus,
more severe recessions increase B;H and lower R;H , which strengthens the pro-cyclicality
of applied tari¤s and the counter-cyclicality of binding overhang. Further, su¢ ciently severe
recessions could force ~R;H < 0 implying that high-tari¤ interests would have to cede control
in recessions to avoid low-tari¤ interests lobbying.
The direct and indirect e¤ect of less frequent recessions, i.e. a lower , move in opposite
directions. Nevertheless, Appendix D shows that the direct e¤ect dominates. The direct
e¤ect of less frequent recessions increases the present discounted value of future income
which strengthens the low-tari¤ interest lobbying threat. In turn, each f!;L = 0 locus shifts
leftward which, all else equal, lowers !;H .34 Thus, less frequent recessions require that
high-tari¤ interests lower B;H and R;H . Indeed, given ~B;H > ~R;H , su¢ ciently infrequent
recessions can also lead to ~R;H < 0 implying that high-tari¤ interests would have to cede
control in recessions to prevent low-tari¤ interests lobbying.
Finally, low-tari¤ interest lobbying may be unavoidable when lobbying is su¢ ciently
e¢ cient, i.e. is su¢ ciently high. More e¢ cient lobbying wastes fewer productive resources
34

For the indirect e¤ect, a lower !0 ;H reduces the future value of lobbying when the state of the economy
is ! =
6 ! 0 and, in turn, the weaker low-tari¤ interest lobbying threat induces high-tari¤ interests to raise
!;H .
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and, thus, reduces the opportunity cost of lobbying in booms and recessions (see (3)). The
direct e¤ect of the stronger low-tari¤ interest lobbying threat shifts the no-lobbying loci
leftward. Appendix D shows that B;H must fall, but the e¤ect on R;H is, in general,
ambiguous. The direct e¤ect is apparent: the stronger lobbying threat via more e¢ cient
lobbying lowers R;H for any given B;H . However, an indirect e¤ect also operates on R;H
because the lower B;H means low-tari¤ interests now receive tari¤ concessions during booms
which mitigates their lobbying threat during recessions. In general, which e¤ect dominates is
indeterminate. However, given ~B;H > ~R;H , continual increases in lobbying e¢ ciency must
eventually reduce R;H . Thus, su¢ ciently e¢ cient lobbying can lead to ~R;H < 0 meaning
high-tari¤ interests cannot preemptively avoid low-tari¤ interests lobbying.
Before analyzing the equilibrium when high-tari¤ interests cede control, we address the
role played by our simplifying assumption that low-tari¤ interests nominate a new tari¤
binding –which rarely takes place in current policy environments –upon successful lobbying.
While this assumption a¤ords signi…cant analytical tractability (allowing us to derive (4)),
it does not a¤ect our qualitative results: tari¤ ‡uctuations are driven by ‡uctuations in the
opportunity cost of lobbying yet the new tari¤ binding a¤ects the future value of lobbying
while leaving the opportunity cost of lobbying proportional to a and, hence, pro-cyclical.
Thus, the key result of our paper, Proposition 1, is robust to assuming that low-tari¤ interests
cannot change the tari¤ binding.35

4.3

When low-tari¤ interests dictate applied tari¤ setting

Economic conditions may dictate that the only way high-tari¤ interests can prevent lowtari¤ interest lobbying is by ceding control of applied tari¤ setting. Lemma 1 says that this
can only happen in recessions, and Proposition 1 says that this can happen with su¢ ciently
severe recessions, su¢ ciently infrequent recessions, and su¢ ciently e¢ cient lobbying. Thus,
we now consider the impact of business cycle ‡uctuations when high-tari¤ interests have
ceded control of the government to low-tari¤ interests, noting that Lemma 1 says that lowtari¤ interests will then maintain control of the government in booms and recessions.
Appendix A shows that the high-tari¤ interest no-lobbying conditions are analogous to
the low-tari¤ interest no-lobbying conditions in (3). While the opportunity cost of lobbying
is lower during recessions, the future value of lobbying does not depend on whether lobbying
takes place in a boom or recession. Thus, all else equal, the high-tari¤ interest no-lobbying
35
Moreover, the low-tari¤ interest future value of lobbying is maximized by = 0. Thus, > 0 can only
reduce the future value of lobbying and, thus, relax f!; L 0. This shifts both no-lobbying loci outwards in
Figure 2. Implicit di¤erentiation of (3) reveals that the shift is greater for the recession no-lobbying locus.
Thus, ~R;H must rise but the e¤ect on ~B;H is, in general, ambiguous.
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condition during recessions is tighter than during booms and, in turn, low-tari¤ interests set
higher tari¤s in recessions than booms to prevent lobbying by high-tari¤ interests. That is,
when low-tari¤ interests maintain control of the government and thus dictate applied tari¤s,
applied tari¤s are counter-cyclical and, in turn, binding overhang is pro-cyclical.
Proposition 2. When low-tari¤ interests maintain control of the government during booms
and recessions, applied tari¤s are counter-cyclical and binding overhang is pro-cyclical.

5

Extensions

5.1

Industry characteristics and lobbying success

So far we assumed that the opposing group captures the government with certainty if it
chooses to lobby. However, in practice, the impact of lobbying on trade policy is uncertain
and depends on the industry characteristics of high- and low-tari¤ interests. Thus, we
now assume that lobbying by the opposing group is unsuccessful with some probability q,
which depends on relevant industry characteristics.36 That is, lobbying is successful with
0
probability 1 q. In the event of unsuccessful lobbying by group i , group i retains control
of setting the applied tari¤, and the tari¤ binding remains unaltered.
Following earlier logic, the low-tari¤ interest no-lobbying conditions in (3) now become
(1
|

) uL (0; A! )

(1
{z

q)

!;L

(

Expected opportunity cost of lobbying

!;H ; 0)

}

(1
|

q) [WL ( = 0)
{z

WL (H)]
}

f!;L

0 (6)

Expected future value of lobbying

for ! = H; L. These no-lobbying conditions have a familiar form from earlier sections.
The possibility of unsuccessful lobbying has two e¤ects on the no-lobbying conditions.
First, the expected opportunity cost of lobbying is higher due to the q !;L ( !;H ; 0) term:
the applied tari¤ remains at !;H rather than falling to zero if lobbying is unsuccessful even
though the costs of lobbying are still incurred. Second, the expected future value of lobbying
falls because the gain WL ( = 0) WL (H) is now only realized upon lobbying with probability 1 q. Thus, the possibility of unsuccessful lobbying relaxes the no-lobbying conditions
and allows high-tari¤ interests to raise preemptive tari¤s. Naturally, the probability of unsuccessful lobbying and therefore the amount by which high-tari¤ interests can raise tari¤s
depends on the relevant industry characteristics.
36

For example, in the spirit of Olson (1965), q may be increasing in the concentration of group i and
0
decreasing in the concentration of group i (however, see recent theoretical and empirical contributions by
Pecorino (1998), Mao and Zaleski (2001) and Macher et al. (2011)). Alternatively, q may be larger for
expanding than contracting industries, given that expanding industries attract entrants which dissipates any
bene…ts of lobbying (Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2002)).
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Nevertheless, as in earlier sections, the opportunity cost of lobbying is lower in recessions
than booms meaning high-tari¤ interests must concede lower tari¤s in recessions than booms
in order to prevent lobbying by low-tari¤ interests. Hence, our main result in Proposition
1 remains: applied tari¤s are pro-cyclical and binding overhang is counter-cyclical when
high-tari¤ interests dictate applied tari¤s.

5.2

Simultaneous lobbying

Until now, only the group not in control of tari¤ setting could lobby. We now consider the
case of simultaneous lobbying and show that the main insights from Section 4 still emerge:
because the opportunity cost of lobbying is pro-cyclical, high-tari¤ interests dictate procyclical tari¤s to mediate the threat of lobbying by low-tari¤ interests.
Speci…cally, suppose high-tari¤ interests are dictating applied tari¤s but consider the
following modi…cation to Stage 3 of the game (see Section 3.2): low-tari¤ interests must
…rst decide whether to initiate a lobbying war and then, if a lobbying war is initiated, highand low-tari¤ interests simultaneously choose an amount of labor to hire for lobbying. As
in Section 3.2, if low-tari¤ interests win the lobbying war then they capture the government
and thereby nominate an applied tari¤ for the current period and a new tari¤ binding.
Alternatively, if low-tari¤ interests are unsuccessful in winning the lobbying war then hightari¤ interests maintain capture of the government and nominate the applied tari¤ !;H .
Letting NS;i denote the labor used for lobbying (or, equivalently, “rent-seeking”) by
group i 2 fH; Lg, let the probability that high-tari¤ interests win the lobbying war, and
hence maintain control of the government, be
q (NS;H ; NS;L ) =

NS;H
NS

(7)

where NS = NS;H + NS;L . That is, q ( ) is the endogenous probability of unsuccessful lobbying by low-tari¤ interests. After the applied tari¤, and potentially the tari¤ binding, is
implemented by the government, then each group i hires an amount of production labor
Ni (w ( ; NS )) at the equilibrium production wage w ( ; NS ).
When low-tari¤ interests initiate a lobbying war, their optimal choice of labor for lobbying
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is determined by the following optimization problem:37
max (1

NS;L ;NL

q (NS;H ; NS;L )) [uL (0; A! ; NL ; NS;L ; NS ) + WL ( = 0)]

(8)

+q (NS;H ; NS;L ) [uL ( ; A! ; NL ; NS;L ; NS ) + WL (H)] :
The one period payo¤ for group i is ui ( ; A! ; Ni ; NS;i ; NS ) = Fi (Ni ; Ki ; A! ) w ( ; NS ) Ni
wS NS;i where (i) wS denotes the equilibrium wage paid to labor used for lobbying and (ii)
Fi ( ; A! ) is the value of output produced by group i using labor (Ni ) and capital (Ki ).38
More speci…cally, Fi ( ; A! ) = pi A! fi (Ni ; Ki ) where fi ( ) is a constant returns to scale
production function and A! is a scale parameter used to capture economy-wide productivity
or price shocks. Solving the …rst order conditions associated with low-tari¤ interests’choice
of lobbying NS;L (see (8)) and high-tari¤ interests’choice of lobbying NS;H , we …nd
qi ( ) =

1
where v
1+v

( ; 0) + [WL ( = 0) WL (H)]
:
WH ( = 0)]
!;H (0; ) + [WH (H)
!;L

(9)

That is, the equilibrium probability of low-tari¤ interests being unsuccessful in winning the
lobbying war is inversely related to the value they place on winning the lobbying war relative
to the value that high-tari¤ interests place on winning the lobbying war.39
Low-tari¤ interests do not initiate a lobbying war if
uL (

!;H ; A! ; NL ; 0; 0)

+ WL (H)

(1

q ( )) [uL (0; ) + WL ( = 0)]
+q ( ) [uL ( ; ) + WL (H)]

which reduces to
u (
|L
(1
|

!;H ; A! ; NL ; 0; 0)

(1

q ( )) uL (0; )
{z

Expected opportunity cost of lobbying

q ( )) [WL ( = 0)
{z

WL (H)]:
}

q ( ) uL ( ; )
}

(10)

Expected future value of lobbying

So again we have the familiar formulation that lobbying does not take place when the (ex37

High-tari¤ interests solve an analogous optimization problem with the appropriate
substitutions:
maxNS;H ;NH (1 q (NS;H ; NS;L )) [uH (0; A! ; NH ; NS;H ; NS ) + WH ( = 0)]
+
q (NS;H ; NS;L ) [uH ( ; A! ,NH ; NS;H ; NS ) + WH (H)].
38
Note that there are three wage variables for each state of the economy ! = H; L: the wage paid to
labor hired for lobbying wS , the wage paid to production labor if high-tari¤ interests win the lobbying
war w ( ; NS ), and the wage paid to production labor if low-tari¤ interests win the lobbying war w (0; NS ).
These wages are related via the equilibrium condition that workers are indi¤erent between being hired for
production or lobbying: wS = q (NS;H ; NS;L ) w ( ; NS ) + (1 q (NS;H ; NS;L )) w (0; NS ).
39
See Appendix B for a derivation of q ( ) and a complete description of the labor market.
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pected) opportunity cost of lobbying exceeds the (expected) future value of lobbying.
Two key questions now follow. Is the low-tari¤ interest no-lobbying condition tighter,
i.e. the low-tari¤ interest lobbying threat stronger, during recessions than booms because
of a lower opportunity cost of lobbying? And, if so, do pro-cyclical tari¤s emerge because
high-tari¤ interests deal with the stronger low-tari¤ interest lobbying threat by setting lower
tari¤s in recessions than booms? In previous sections, the answer to both questions was yes.
In Section 4, the opportunity cost of lobbying was proportional to A! (see, e.g., equations
(2) and (3)) and thus lower during recessions. This could be interpreted as a “direct productivity e¤ect”: due to productivity or price shocks, the marginal revenue product of labor
was low during recessions which increased the attractiveness of using scarce labor resources
for non-production purposes. But, implicitly, recessions did not a¤ect the allocation of labor
between (i) the two production sectors, regardless of whether lobbying took place, and (ii)
lobbying and output production. The same is true here for …xed levels of lobbying.40 Thus,
for …xed lobbying and hence …xed q ( ), the direct productivity e¤ect still implies that the
opportunity cost of lobbying is lower in recessions than booms. Therefore, all else equal,
high-tari¤ interests still face a stronger lobbying threat from low-tari¤ interests in recessions
than booms in the presence of simultaneous lobbying.
However, the di¤erence between earlier sections and the current simultaneous lobbying
setup is that recessions can also a¤ect the allocation of labor between lobbying and production. That is, recessions can a¤ect the level of labor sucked from the production sectors into
lobbying. Moreover, this recession induced labor reallocation between lobbying and output
production can also a¤ect the probability that each group wins the lobbying war.
Conditional on a lobbying war, the e¤ect of recessions on this labor reallocation mechanism is ambiguous. On the one hand, recessions lower the marginal revenue product of
labor used for production and, via reduced labor demand for production, exert downward
pressure on wages. All else equal, this increases labor hired for lobbying. On the other hand,
recessions also shrink labor demand for lobbying by scaling down the current period bene…t
of gaining tari¤ setting, i.e. !;L ( ; 0), since it is proportional to A! .41 Thus, conditional on
a lobbying war, it is unclear how recessions a¤ect the level of labor hired for lobbying. In
turn, it is unclear how recessions a¤ect the probability of each group winning a lobbying war.
Therefore, the direct productivity e¤ect driving our earlier results remains the key insight
40

To see this, note that labor market equilibrium requires that the marginal revenue product of labor
equalize between the two production sectors. But, this holds regardless of the value of A! , and hence
regardless of whether the current period is a boom or recession, because the marginal revenue product of
labor in each sector is proportional to A! .
41
Note ui ( ) = pi A! fiK ( ) Ki wS NS;i where fiK ( ) is the marginal product of capital. Thus, !;L ( ; 0)
is proportional to A! because wS = q ( ) w ( ; NS ) + (1 q ( )) w (0; NS ) where w ( ) is proportional to A!
since production wages equal the marginal revenue product of labor.
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when comparing the opportunity cost of lobbying between booms and recessions.
The second question above is whether high-tari¤ interests deal with a stronger lobbying
threat by low-tari¤ interests in recessions relative to booms by lowering R;H below B;H .
A lower R;H a¤ects the no-lobbying conditions through three channels: directly via the
opportunity cost and the future value of lobbying; indirectly via the probability of winning a
lobbying war; and indirectly via the e¤ect on the level of production labor. The direct e¤ect
is the same as previous sections: with a …xed labor allocation (between high- and low-tari¤
interests as well as between production and lobbying) and a …xed q ( ), high-tari¤ interests
neutralize the stronger lobbying threat of low-tari¤ interests in recessions relative to booms
by lowering the recession tari¤ R;H below the boom tari¤ B;H . This raises the opportunity
cost and lowers the future value of lobbying by low-tari¤ interests.
But a lower R;H can also indirectly a¤ect the no-lobbying condition by impacting the
probability of winning the lobbying war and the amount of labor used for production. First,
(9) shows the impact on q( ) is ambiguous because a lower R;H lowers the future value of
winning the lobbying war for both high- and low-tari¤ interests: low-tari¤ interests now gain
less by forcing the tari¤ to zero and high-tari¤ interests lose less if low-tari¤ interests force
the tari¤ to zero. Second, all else equal, a lower R;H reduces labor hired for lobbying via
reducing the future value of lobbying. This increases output during the lobbying war and,
in turn, reduces the opportunity cost of lobbying (see (10)). Therefore, it appears that these
two indirect e¤ects of a lower R;H mitigate the direct e¤ect of a lower R;H discussed in
the previous paragraph. That is, relative to earlier sections, a lower R;H is less e¤ective
in eliminating low-tari¤ interest lobbying incentives. In turn, simultaneous lobbying should
actually increase the degree of tari¤ pro-cyclicality by magnifying the extent that high-tari¤
interests must lower R;H to prevent lobbying by low-tari¤ interests.

6

Conclusion

This paper contributes to a small but growing literature analyzing why countries set their
applied tari¤s below the tari¤ bindings negotiated in the WTO. Rather than modify or
extend the traditional terms of trade-based model of trade agreements, we develop a novel,
dynamic, single-country model emphasizing domestic political competition. Viewing the
government as being captured by either low-tari¤ interests (e.g. export …rms or …rms using
imported inputs) or high-tari¤ interests (e.g. import-competing …rms), tari¤ ‡uctuations
naturally emerge as a means for the group that has captured the government to mitigate the
time-varying lobbying threat of the opposing group. As a result, binding overhang emerges
in equilibrium. This framework allows us to make two distinct contributions.
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First, we show that when high-tari¤ interests have captured the government and are
dictating applied tari¤s, binding overhang is counter-cyclical and applied tari¤s are procyclical. This matches our empirical observations that binding overhang is counter-cyclical
in developing countries, where high-tari¤ interests have signi…cant in‡uence over tari¤ policy.
Further, to our knowledge, ours is the …rst theory to explain the pro-cyclicality of applied
tari¤s. The key intuition is simple: the opportunity cost of lobbying by low-tari¤ interests
is lower during recessions because recessions are associated with lower productivity, and
so using labor for lobbying rather than producing output is relatively attractive during
recessions. Thus, high-tari¤ interests preemptively nominate lower applied tari¤s during
recessions to prevent low-tari¤ interests from lobbying and gaining in‡uence over tari¤setting.
Our second contribution is that we provide a structural interpretation for the existence of
a random political pressure variable in terms of trade-based models of trade agreements. Such
models generate binding overhang in equilibrium because exogenous ex post random political
pressure generates ex ante demand for ‡exibility in applied tari¤ setting. However, we
develop a model where the dynamics of domestic political competition, based on time varying
opportunity costs of lobbying, lead to lobbying threats whose intensity endogenously varies
over time. The time varying intensity of lobbying threats drives the dynamic ‡uctuations in
binding overhang and can be interpreted as a random political pressure variable.
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Appendix
A

High tari¤ interest no-lobbying condition

Following similar logic to that underlying the no-lobbying conditions in Section 4.2, hightari¤ interests will not lobby regardless of the state of the economy if the following nolobbying conditions hold for ! = H; L:
uH (
|

!;L ; A! )

{z

[WH (H) WH (L)]
|
{z
}

uH ( ; A ! )
}

f!;H

(11)

0:

future value of lobbying

opportunity cost of lobbying

The interpretation of (11) follows that of (3). In particular, the opportunity cost of lobbying
during recessions is lower than during booms for a given tari¤ . Further, using Lemma 1
and the one shot deviation principle, we have:
WH (H)

B

WH (L) =

1

1
(1

)

[

a

B;H

(0;

R;L )

+ (1

)

B;H

(

B;L ;

B;H )] :

(12)

Simultaneous lobbying

Derivation of endogenous q ( )
L( )
Before solving the low-tari¤ interests’optimization problem in (8), note that (i) @W
=0
@NS;L
because the only link between NS;L and the continuation payo¤ is via the probability of
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winning the current period lobbying war and (ii) low-tari¤ interests take wages as given.
Thus, the …rst order condition for NS;L in (8) is
wR =

@q (:)
@q (:)
[uL (0; A! ; NL ; NS;L ; NS ) + WL ( = 0)]+
[uL ( ; A! ; NL ; NS;L ; NS ) + WL (H)]
@NS;L
@NS;L

which simpli…es to
@q (:)
[
@NS;L

wR =

!;L

WL (H)]] :

(13)

WH ( = 0)]] :

(14)

( ; 0) + [WL ( = 0)

Analogously, we have the following for high-tari¤ interests:
wR =

@q (:)
[
@NS;H

!;H

(0; ) + [WH (H)

And we also have
NS;H
NS;L
@q (:)
@q (:)
=
=
> 0.
2 < 0 and
@NS;L
@NS;H
(NS;H + NS;L )
(NS;H + NS;L )2
N

1

(15)

S;L
Thus, given q ( ) = 1 + NS;H
, (9) follows by equating the FOCs (13) and (14) and then
using (15).
Labour market equilibrium
For each state of the economy ! = B; R, 10 endogenous variables characterize labor
market equilibrium when a lobbying war takes place: high-tari¤ interest lobbying NS;H ; lowtari¤ interest lobbying NS;L ; production labor used by low-tari¤ interests when low-tari¤
interests win the lobbying war, i.e. NL (w (0; NS )), and when high-tari¤ interests win the
lobbying war, i.e. NL (w ( ; NS )); production labor used by high-tari¤ interests when lowtari¤ interests win the lobbying war, i.e. NH (w (0; NS )), and when high-tari¤ interests win
the lobbying war, i.e. NH (w ( ; NS )); wages paid to labor hired for lobbying wS ; wages paid
to labor hired for production when low-tari¤ interests win the lobbying war, i.e. w (0; NS ),
and when high-tari¤ interests win the lobbying war, i.e. w ( ; NS ); the probability that
low-tari¤ interests are unsuccessful in winning the lobbying war q (NS;H ; NS;L ).
For each state of the economy ! = B; R, 10 equations solve these 10 endogenous variables:
two FOCs for NS;H and NS;L given by (13) and (14); two FOCs for production labor when
low-tari¤ interests win the lobbying war, i.e. NH (w (0; NS )) and NL (w (0; NS )), whereby the
wage must equal the marginal revenue product of labor; two FOCs for production labor when
high-tari¤ interests win the lobbying war, i.e. NH (w ( ; NS )) and NL (w ( ; NS )), whereby
the wage must equal the marginal revenue product of labor; two full employment conditions
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N = NS + NH (w ( ; NS )) + NL (w ( ; NS )) corresponding to whether low-tari¤ interests win
the lobbying war, i.e. = 0, or high-tari¤ interests win the lobbying war, i.e. = ; the
condition whereby workers are indi¤erent between being hired for lobbying or production:
wS = q (NS;H ; NS;L ) w ( ; NS ) + (1 q (NS;H ; NS;L )) w (0; NS ); and, …nally, (7) which de…nes
the probability that low-tari¤ interests lose the lobbying war.

C

Proofs

Proof of Lemma 1
Consider a strategy pro…le where players never cede control if they can maintain control
by nominating an applied tari¤ such that the no-lobbying condition of the opposing group
holds. We will show there is no pro…table one-shot deviation whereby the dictating group
cedes control in the current period but never cedes control again. Thus, by the one shot
deviation principle, it is optimal to maintain control where possible.
We begin by supposing low-tari¤ interests have control. Will low-tari¤ interests deviate and cede control? Noting that only ceding control in booms is not optimal for hightari¤ interests (because B;H > R;H and a < 1 imply that uH (0; AR ) uH R;H ; AR +
[WH (L) WH (H)] > uH (0; AB ) uH B;H ; AB + [WH (L) WH (H)]), there are two
subcases to consider. First, suppose high-tari¤ interests cede control in recessions and booms.
Thus, low-tari¤ interests will regain control in the following period if they cede control in
the current period and hence, given that R;L > B;L , the maximum gain from the one-shot
deviation is R;L R;L ; + B;L B;H ; 0 . In turn, a su¢ cient condition for the one-shot
deviation to be unpro…table is R;L R;L ; + B;L B;H ; 0 < 0 which is part (iii) of Assumption 1. Second, suppose high-tari¤ interests cede control only in recessions. The expected
bene…t of the one-shot deviation for low-tari¤ interests when the state of the economy is
) B;L B;L ; B;H + R;L R;L ; 0 .42 Thus, given
! is
+ 1 (1 ) (1
!;L
!;L ;
< 0, a su¢ cient condition for < 0 and, hence, the one-shot deviation to be
!;L
!;L ;
unpro…table is R;L R;L ; 0 +(1
) B;L B;L ; B;H < 0 which is part (v) of Assumption
1. Therefore, given part (ii) of Assumption 1, low-tari¤ interests never cede control.
Now suppose high-tari¤ interests have control. Note, ceding control is costly for high-tari¤
interests: low-tari¤ interests nominate a zero tari¤ in the current period if high-tari¤ interests
cede control and uH !;H ; A!
uH (0; A! ). Given we have established low-tari¤ interests
never cede control, then the high-tari¤ interest continuation payo¤ from ceding control is
42

The interpretation of the terms in is as follows: (i) the …rst term re‡ects the lost payo¤ due to ceding
control in the current period, (ii) the second term re‡ects the change in the expected discounted payo¤ until
high tari¤ interests cede control in the next recession, (iii) the third term re‡ects the expected discounted
payo¤ gained when high-tari¤ interests cede control in the next recession.
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WH (L) = 1 1
uH R;L ; AR + (1
) uH B;L ; AB and ceding control is unpro…table if
WH (L) WH (H) < 0. If high-tari¤ interests can maintain control in booms and recessions
1
uH R;H ; AR + (1
) uH B;H ; AB . Thus, ceding control is not
then WH (H)
1
optimal if R;H R;H ; R;L +(1
) B;H B;H ; B;L < 0 which is part (iv) of Assumption
1. If high-tari¤ interests cannot maintain control in recessions, then never ceding control in
booms implies WH (H) WH (L) is given by (12). In turn, ceding control during booms is not
optimal if R;H 0; R;L + (1
) B;H B;H ; B;L < 0 which is part (iv) of Assumption 1
with R;H = 0.
Finally, part (i) of Assumption 1 implies high-tari¤ interests may not be able to maintain
control in recessions. In this case, i.e. R;H < 0, it is optimal for high-tari¤ interests to cede
control because otherwise low-tari¤ interests will lobby and a zero tari¤ binding will follow
) B;H 0; B;L > 0.
and we have WH (L) WH ( = 0) = 1 1
R;H 0; R;L + (1
Proof of Proposition 1
Lemma 1 implies high-tari¤ interests maintain control of tari¤ setting when possible.
In this case, by construction, their optimal tari¤s are given by (5). Note that the future
value of low-tari¤ interest lobbying (see (4)) is independent of the current period state of
the economy !. Moreover, the opportunity cost of low-tari¤ interest lobbying (see (3))
is lower in recessions than booms for a given tari¤ because uL ( ; AR )
uL (0; AR ) =
a [uL ( ; AB )
uL (0; AB )] and a < 1. Thus, fB;L > fR;L for a given tari¤ and, in turn,
@f
fB;L = fR;L = 0 requires R;H < B;H given @!;L < 0. Hence, applied tari¤s are pro-cyclical
and binding overhang is counter-cyclical.
For the degree of cyclicality and the likelihood of high-tari¤ interests maintaining control
of the government, we rely on the comparative statics derived in Appendix D (see (22)).
@ ( B;H
R;H )
<0
The degree of cyclicality is increasing in the severity of recessions because
@a
@ B;H
@ R;H
since @a < 0 < @a . Moreover, high-tari¤ interests are more likely to maintain control
of the government, i.e. ~R;H > 0, under the conditions described in the proposition because
@ R;H
@
@
@
@
> 0; @R;H > 0, @B;H < 0 and @R;H 7 0. Note, @B;H < 0 and ~B;H > ~R;H implies
@a
@
that, all else equal, ~R;H < 0 is possible once is su¢ ciently large even if @R;H > 0 for some
range of .
Proof of Proposition 2
Lemma 1 implies low-tari¤ interests maintain control of tari¤ setting when possible. Note
that the future value of high-tari¤ interest lobbying (see (12)) is independent of the current
period state of the economy !. Moreover, the opportunity cost of high-tari¤ interest lobbying
is lower in recessions than booms for a given tari¤ because uH ( ; AR )
uH ( ; A R ) =
a [uH ( ; AB )
uH ( ; AB )] and a < 1. Thus, fB;H > fR;H for a given tari¤ and, in
@f
turn, fB;H = fR;H = 0 requires R;L > B;L given @!;H > 0. Hence, applied tari¤s are
29

counter-cyclical and binding overhang is pro-cyclical.

D

Comparative statics

Totally di¤erentiating the no-lobbying conditions, we have
"

B;H
R;H
fB;L
fB;L
B;H
R;H
fR;L
fR;L

#"

d
d

B;H
R;H

#

+

"

#

x
fB;L
x
fR;L

dx =

"

0
0

#

where x is a parameter of interest and superscripts denote partial derivatives (for example,
@fB;L
R;H
). This can be written more compactly as
fB;L
@ R;H
A

"

d
d

B;H
R;H

#

+ F dx =

"

#

0
0

so that, using standard matrix notation,
@

B;H

@x

=

A12 F2
A11 A22

A22 F1
@ R;H
=
and
A12 A21
@x

A11 F2
A11 A22

A21 F1
:
A12 A21

(16)

Note that
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(1 +

2 ) B;L

(

A22 =

(1 +

1 ) a B;L

R;H

a
F1 = fB;L
=

1 B;L

B;H ; 0)

(

(

< A21 =

R;H ; 0)

R;H ; 0)

B;H

2 B;L

(

R;H

< A12 =

1 a B;L

a
< 0 < F2 = fR;L
=

1
a

B;H ; 0)

(
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(17)

<0

(

<0

(18)

B;H ; 0)

(19)

F1 = fB;L = F2 = fR;L =

(20)

F1 = fB;L =

(21)

[a B;L ( R;H ; 0)
B;L ( B;H ; 0)] > 0
1
uL (0; AB ) < F2 = fR;L = auL (0; AB ) < 0

and 2
(1
where 1
1
1
Thus, using (17)-(21) in (16) yields
@

B;H

@a

<0<

@

R;H

@a

;

@

B;H

@

) and where (20) relies on

=

@

R;H

@

> 0 and
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@

B;H

@

R;H

< 0 but

<

@

B;H

R;H

@

and a < 1.

7 0.

(22)

E

Tables
Table 1: Frequency of applied tari¤ changes at country-product level
Developing
N
%

Applied
Applied
Applied
Applied
Total

tari¤ only decreases
tari¤ always unchanged
tari¤ only increases
tari¤ increases and decreases

Developed
N
%

40,493
61,278
3,886
15,416

33.45
50.61
3.21
12.73

4,319
29,721
3,041
2,250

10.98
75.57
7.73
5.72

121,073

100

39,331

100

Notes: The sample is that described in Section 2.
A product is a HS6 category.
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Table 2: Cyclicality of overhang and applied tari¤s
Panel A: Cyclicality of binding overhang
Developing
(1)
(2)
(3)
BCi;t

1

M Pi;j
P T A_IMi;j;t
IMi;j;t

1

sd IMi;j;t

1

yi;t

1

N

1

M Pi;j
P T A_IMi;j;t
IMi;j;t

1

sd IMi;j;t

1

yi;t

1

N

(1)

(4)

-11.381z
(5.832)
0.008
(0.008)
-0.175
(0.184)
0.013
(0.014)
0.105*
(0.030)
6.516z
(3.896)

-12.953y
(6.080)
0.007
(0.007)
-0.138
(0.195)
0.007
(0.014)
0.113*
(0.027)
6.945z
(4.091)

-16.801y
(6.812)
0.013
(0.010)
-0.277
(0.207)
0.020
(0.017)
0.099*
(0.034)
13.106y
(5.829)

-14.478y
(5.983)
0.009
(0.007)
-0.155
(0.177)
0.017
(0.015)
0.113*
(0.030)
7.737z
(4.211)

1.566
(2.191)
-0.012
(0.009)
0.064
(0.141)
-0.006
(0.008)
0.096y
(0.042)
-1.207*
(0.426)

1.921
(2.441)
-0.009
(0.008)
-0.1743z
(0.103)
-0.002
(0.007)
0.063z
(0.034)
-1.320*
(0.451)

1.972
(2.438)
-0.013
(0.009)
0.056
(0.146)
-0.003
(0.009)
0.099y
(0.048)
-1.201*
(0.427)

-1.029
(2.268)
-0.012
(0.009)
0.098
(0.151)
-0.008
(0.007)
0.089y
(0.043)
-0.882y
(0.447)

1000771

921528

851294

828553

366544

327342

350952

306463

(4)

(1)

(2)

Panel B: Cyclicality of applied tari¤
Developing
(1)
(2)
(3)
BCi;t

(4)

Developed
(2)
(3)

Developed
(3)

(4)

11.694y
(5.836)
-0.006
(0.006)
0.254
(0.181)
-0.011
(0.014)
0.007
(0.023)
-6.796z
(3.882)

13.293y
(6.085)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.197
(0.195)
-0.006
(0.014)
-0.015
(0.023)
-7.291z
(4.075)

17.091y
(6.814)
-0.010
(0.006)
0.362z
(0.202)
-0.018
(0.017)
-0.009
(0.025)
-13.312y
(5.823)

14.832y
(5.988)
-0.008
(0.006)
0.238
(0.175)
-0.017
(0.015)
0.007
(0.023)
-8.120z
(4.187)

-1.428
(2.219)
0.042
(0.045)
0.305*
(0.074)
-0.011
(0.021)
0.341
(0.249)
1.077*
(0.416)

-1.834
(2.461)
-0.0092y
(0.005)
0.287*
(0.060)
-0.003
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.019)
1.145y
(0.446)

-2.060
(2.449)
0.044
(0.048)
0.321*
(0.077)
-0.015
(0.024)
0.402
(0.291)
1.126*
(0.416)

1.320
(2.279)
0.034
(0.040)
0.291*
(0.076)
0.007
(0.024)
0.295
(0.215)
0.858y
(0.431)

1000771

921528

851294

828553

366544

327342

350952

306463

Notes: The sample in Column (1) is that described in Section 2. Two-way clustered standard errors
are used by clustering at the country-year and country-HS4 level. Year and country-HS4 …xed e¤ects
included. Column (2) excludes agricultural products. Column (3) excludes new WTO members.
Column (4) excludes Great Recession years. See Table 5 for variable de…nitions and data sources.
z p<0.10, y p<0.05, * p<0.01
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Table 3: Direct (D) and indirect (I) e¤ects of changing economic conditions on tari¤s set by
high-tari¤ interests

B;H

D

#a
I
Net

+

+

D

+

#
I

Net

D

+
+

R;H

"
I

Net

+
+

+/

Table 4: Summary Statistics

N
vi;j;t
i;j;t

BCi;t 1
M Pi;j
P T A_IMi;j;t
IMi;j;t 1
sd IMi;j;t 1
yi;t 1

1001101
1001101
1001101
1001101
1001101
1001101
1001101
1001101

Developing
Mean Std. Dev.
20.845
9.974
-0.001
-3.100
0.298
0.064
0.844
27.765

17.086
15.251
0.021
2.511
0.367
1.081
0.741
3.142

Min

Max

0
0
-0.135
-11.279
0
-14.094
0.000
21.796

1485
3000
0.067
19.687
1
13.858
14.467
35.381

N

Mean

Developed
Std. Dev.

366687
366687
366687
366687
366687
366687
366687
366687

8.747
5.013
0.001
-1.800
0.332
0.048
0.586
28.348

13.407
11.279
0.017
3.679
0.359
0.797
0.613
3.171

Notes: See Table 5 for a description of the variables and their source.

33

Min

Max

0
0
-0.064
-11.043
0
-12.414
0.000
21.809

340
800.3
0.053
21.723
1
12.755
13.182
34.768

Table 5: Variable de…nitions and sources
Description

Source

Applied tari¤ of country i on product j
in year t

WTO Integrated Database and
UNCTAD TRAINS database
(http://wits.worldbank.org/)
WTO Integrated Database (http://
wits.worldbank.org/) and new member
accession schedules (http://www.wto.
org/english/tratop_e/schedules_e/goods_
schedules_table_e.htm)

Tari¤ variables
i;j;t

vi;j;t

Tari¤ binding less applied tari¤ for
country i on product j in year t

Covariates
BCi;t 1

yi;t

Country i’s detrended log real GDP
in year t 1 using Hodrick Prescott
(HP) …lter with real GDP measured
in local currency units
Country i’s trend log real GDP in year
t 1 using HP …lter

1

M Pi;j

Natural log of

P T A_IMi;j;t

IMi;j;t

1

sd IMi;j;t

1

1
i;j

where

i;j

is the export

supply elasticity of product j from the
perspective of the importer i
Weighted share of country i’s imports
of product j in year t sourced from
countries who are FTA or CU partners
of country i. The (time-invariant) weights
use import shares in product j from a
year prior to country i appearing in sample
Change in country i log real imports of
product j between years t 1 and t 2
(measured in 000’s million 2010USD)
Standard deviation of IMi;j;t 1 over
the sample period
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World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (http://data.worldbank.org/
data-catalog/world-developmentindicators); UN National Accounts Main
Aggregates Database (http://unstats.un.org/
unsd/snaama/introduction.asp); Penn World
Tables (https://pwt.sas.upenn.edu/)
Nicita et al. (2013)

COMTRADE (http://wits.worldbank
.org/); NSF-Kellogg Institute Data
Base on Economic Integration
Agreements (http://kellogg.nd.edu/faculty
/fellows/bergstrand.shtml);
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FP.CPI.TOTL

